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NOTES AND COMMENT
ELECrRIC RATES IN PUBLIC HousING PROJECTS
The New York Public Service Law forbids electric companies
charging one person or corporation more than any other person or
corporation for a like service.1 The statute does not refer to public
buildings, and a question has, therefore, arisen as to whether public
housing projects fall within its purview or whether they are entitled
to the lower rates charged public buildings.
The only reported New York case directly on the point was
recently decided by the Supreme Court of Richmond County. In a
suit by Edison Corporation of Staten Island against the New York
City Housing Authority and the City of New York,2 the court held
that residential buildings owned and operated by the Housing Author-
ity were "public buildings", and therefore entitled to lower rates.
The court quotes with approval Missouri and Ohio cases where
the question came before those courts, but feels bound by the case
of New York City Housing Authority v. Muller.a The latter opinion
can be cited as authority for one proposition only, to wit: The city
has constitutional authority to acquire land to erect houses for resi-
dential purposes. It did not, however, declare such buildings for all
purposes to be public buildings. One object only was sought under
the act which set up the New York City Housing Authority, namely,
slum clearance. The decision must be read in that light. To use
the court's own words :
In a matter of far reaching concern, the public is seeking to take the defen-
dant's property and to administer it as part of a project conceived and to be
carried out in its own interest and for its own protection. That is a public
benefit and, therefore, at least as far as this case is concerned, a public use.4
(Italics added.)
To emphasize the fact that the court there was interpreting the
word "public" only to fit the facts of that case, it used these words:
The cure [for slums] is to be wrought, not through the regulated ownership
of the individual, but through the ownership and operation by or under the
direct control of the public itself.5
IN. Y. PUBLIC SEavicp LAw § 65, subd. 2, contains the following provi-
sion: "No . . . electric corporation . . . shall directly or indirectly, by any
special rate, rebate, drawback or other device or method, charge, demand, collect
or receive from any person or corporation a greater or less compensation
for ... electricity or for any service rendered or to be rendered or in connec-
tion therewith, except as authorized in this chapter, than it charges, demands,
collects or receives from any other person or corporation for doing a like and
contemporaneous service with respect thereto under the same or substantially
similar circumstances or conditions."
2 Staten Island Edison Corp. v. N. Y. City Housing Authority and City
of New York, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 639 (1944).
3270 N. Y. 333, 1 N. E. (2d) 153 (1936).
4 N. Y. City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y. 333, 343, 1 N. E.
(2d) 153 (1936).
5 Id. at 341, 1 N. E. (2d) 153 (1936).
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This citation makes it clear enough that the court there was
upholding the authority of the city to own and operate buildings for
residential purposes, not to purchase services at a lower rate, which
services were furnished by a private corporation.
The case of Bush Terminal Co. v. City of New York,6 seems to
be even less controlling on the court in this case. The two ques-
ions answered in that case were: 1. Does the New York Port
Authority, concededly a public agency, have power to erect a build-
ing, part of which was not used for terminal purposes?, and 2. Could
such buildings, by agreement with the municipalities involved, be
exempt from the regular taxation to which other commercial build-
ings were subject? Both questions were answered in the affirmative.
Nowhere does it appear, however, that the court passed upon any
right of the public agency to require a private corporation to furnish
it with services at a lower rate than that obtainable by other businesses
in the area. The case does not even hold that public agencies are
immune from taxation, much less that they are entitled to lower
power rates or any other services. Chief Judge Lehman, at the close
of the opinion, says with emphasis:
We decide only that the parties may make a contract in accordance with the
provisions of the statute. 7
It might seem to be going somewhat afield to discuss the immun-
ity of public agencies from taxation, but since the Supreme Court
has relied largely on tax cases in support of its decision, we will
examine two or three to see if they justify the decision reached by
the court. As we have just seen, the Bush Terminal case, supra,
does not hold that public agencies are immune from taxation, only
that one could make an agreement to pay a certain sum annually in
lieu of taxes to a municipality as provided by statute.
Lloyd v. Mayor,8 relied on by the court, says that the City of
New York possesses two kinds of powers, public and private. It
does not distinguish between the two, but leaves that task to the
courts as each case arises. It merely held that in cleaning sewers
the city was exercising a private power, that it was responsible for
the acts of its agents in leaving unguarded an excavation made in the
street for purposes of cleaning the sewer, and that the city was liable
in damages to plaintiff whose horse died from injuries sustained by
stepping into the hole on a dark night. How that case can be con-
strued as supporting the immunity of a public agency from taxation.
6 Bush Terminal Co. v. City of New York, 282 N. Y. 306. 26 N. E. (2d)
269 (1940).
7 Bush Terminal Co. v. City of New York. 282 N. Y. 306, 322, 26 N. E.
(2d) 269 (1940), cited mipra note 6; Chapter 553 of the Laws of 1931 author-
ized the N. Y. Port Authority to enter into voluntary agreements with any
municipality in the port district whereby it will undertake to pay a fair and
reasonable sum annually in connection with any marine or inland terminal
owned by it, "not in excess of the sum last paid as taxes upon such property
prior to the time of its acquisition by the Port Authority."
8 Lloyd v. Mayor of City of New York, 5 N. Y. 369 (1851).
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or from regular electric rates, is very difficult to see.
Kennedy & Co. v. N. Y. World's Fair 1939, Inc.,9 cited by the
court, held that a mechanic's lien cannot attach to city-owned real
estate and the improvements thereon, although it may attach to any
sums that the municipality may have appropriated for making the
improvements. Neither the tax issue nor any issue relating to ser-
vice by a public utility was involved in that case.
County of Herkiner v. Village of Herkimer, ° which the court
cites in its interpretation of the tax law of this state, does not seem
to be authority for the proposition that the Edwin Markham Houses
involved in the Staten Island case are public buildings in every sense
of the word, not even for taxation. On the contrary, the Herkiner
case held that certain lands and buildings acquired by the county
were not exempt from taxation by the village. Said the court:
The expression "public use", as employed in the statute, has never been defined
with exactitude. . . . Certainly the land is not used in the sense of being
occupied or employed for any public purpose. Most of it is idle, and not used
at all; the balance is in the possession of private individuals as lessees, and
not of the public generally. Under these circumstances plaintiff is not entitled
to exemption under the statute.11
The court takes pains to point out that in connection with the
expression "public use":
Its meaning must necessarily depend upon the peculiar circumstances of each
case.
1 2
An analysis of the foregoing cases does not support the decision
of the court in the Staten Island case. It seems clear that the Edwin
Markham Houses were not "public buildings" under the peculiar
circumstances of this case and therefore not entitled to lower electric
rates.
To the extent that the buildings are occupied by private individ-
uals and families, they are, in that sense, private. They are not in
the same category as schools, prisons, hospitals, asylums, or court-
houses owned and operated by a state or municipality. A Missouri
court had this to say of a housing project owned by the city:
The apartments in these buildings are rented to private individuals in which
these individuals and their families live. In fact, they are rented in competi-
tion with privately owned apartment buildings. They are not open to the
public, and, therefore, are not public buildings. 13
The Supreme Court of the State of Ohio, in a decision recently
handed down by it, says:
9 Kennedy & Co. v. N. Y. World's Fair 1939, Inc., 260 App. Div. 386,
22 N. Y. S. (2d) 901 (2d Dep't 1940).
10 County of Herkimer v. Village of Herkimer, 251 App. Div. 126, 295
N. Y. Supp. 629 (4th Dep't 1937).
11 Id. at 127, 295 N. Y. Supp. 629 (4th Dep't 1937).
12 Id. at 128, 295 N. Y. Supp. 629 (4th Dep't 1937).
13 People ex rel. Ferguson v. Donnell, 349 Mo. 975, 163 S. W. (2d) 940
(1942).
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In the instant case, the appellant is engaged in the business enterprise of being
a landlord-a fact the true nature of which cannot be changed arbitrarily by
mere legislative enactment alone. Clearly the appellant is a proprietor and as
such cannot be heard to complain when its property is not permitted to escape
the tax burden common to all proprietors.14
In the Youngstown case, this language appeared:
It seems to us clear that where dwellings are leased to family units for the
purpose of private homes, the use of such dwellings is private and not public.'5
It should not be overlooked that current supplied to such build-
ings is subject to taxation as current supplied to private buildings.
The Federal Government taxes the Edison Corporation for this cur-
rent supplied to the New York City Housing Authority at the rate
charged to privately owned apartments, whereas it would be taxed
at a lower rate if the Federal Government considered it a "public
building".16  Just as such buildings are taxed as private buildings,
they should be charged the same rates as other buildings privately
owned in the area.
It is the policy of the law to require all property to bear its just share of the
expenses of government. That is a just and equitable rule, Unless expressly
exempt by statute, all real estate, no matter by whom it is owned, is taxable. 17
In the case of Board of Education v. Baker,'8 the New York
Appellate Division said:
An exemption from taxation ... relieves one class of persons or property
from its obligation to bear its share of the expenses of government, no matter
how deserving of assistance that class may be, and throws a correspondingly
heavier burden upon all other classes, thus creating an inequality of taxation.
It is for this reason that the courts have uniformly refused to favor exemp-
tions, and have invariably construed statutes freeing property from the burden
of enforced contribution to the expense of maintaining the government most
rigidly against the claimant, and have declined to countenance such immunity
unless the purpose of the legislature to exempt such property indisputably
appears.19
For the same reasons that courts have been extremely reluctant
to grant immunity from taxation, the state has been reluctant to
24 Federal Public Housing Authority v. Guckenberger, 143 Ohio St. 251,
55 N. E. (2d) 265 (1944).25Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Ewatt, 143 Ohio St.
268, 55 N. E. (2d) 122 (1944).
16 INTERNAL REvENUE BuLLETIN, No. 15.
17 County of Herkimer v. Village of Herkimer, 251 App. Div. 126, 127,
295 N. Y. 629 (4th Dep't 1937).
is Matter of Board of Education of Jamestown v. Baker, 241 App. Div.
574, 272 N. Y. Supp. 801 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 636, 195 N. E. 359
(1935).
29 Matter of Board of Education of City of Jamestown v. Baker, 241 App.
Div. 574, 272 N. Y. Supp. 801 (,1934), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 636, 195 N. E. 359
(1935).
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favor one class of persons or property over another in paying public
utility rates. 20 If the tenants of the Edwin Markham Houses and
other projects of a like nature are given lower electric rates, tenants
in privately owned houses must of necessity pay higher rates than
they otherwise would. It is not as if all the tenants in such projects
were of the lower income group and all families outside -are of a
higher income group. The tenants of the Edwin Markham Houses
form but a very small fraction of the families in the income group in
which they fall. Justice Crouch, who wrote the opinion in the Muller
case, made this observation:
The designated class to whom incidental benefits will come are persons with
an income under $2,500 a year, and it consists of two-thirds of the city's
poptdation.21 . (Italics added.)
Just why a small fraction of the city's population should pay
lower rates than others in the same income group, the court in the
Staten Island case does not make clear. What the court said in
Board of Education v. Baker as to taxation is just as applicable to
public utility rates. A discriminatory reduction of rates:
Relieves one class of persons or property from its obligation to bear its share
of the expenses ... no matter how deserving of assistance that class may be,
and throws a correspondingly heavier burden upon all other classes. 22
The conclusion to be reached is that no reported decision prior
to the Staten Island case held city-owned residential houses to be
"public buildings" in the sense that they are entitled to lower electric
rates; that the great majority of the cases, both in New York and in
sister states, hold them to be "private" for tax purposes; and that
the Richmond County Supreme Court was not bound by the Muller
case nor any other cited case to hold that such houses are entitled to
lower electric rates as "public buildings". Allowing city-owned resi-
dential houses to qualify as "public buildings" in order to obtain
lower electric rates appears to be discriminatory and violative of
Section 65, Subdivision 2, of the New York Public Service Law.23
ISAAc G. McNATT.
STOCK DIVIDENDS-ELIMINATING ACCRUED BUT UNDECLARED
CUMULATIVE DIVIDENDS BY CHARTER AMENDMENT
In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,' the court said, "A business cor-
poration is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of stock-
holders." Every stockholder, when purchasing shares of stock in a
20 N. Y. PUBLIC SERVICE LAw § 65, subd. 2, cited mspra note 1.
21 N. Y. City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y. 333, 1 N. E. (2d)
153 (1936).
22 Cited mspra note 18.
23 Cited supra note 1.
1204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 668 (1919).
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